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140 South Dearborn Street
CHICAGO
Pamphlet No. 5

INTRODUCTORY

LETTER

from
CHARLES

G.

DAWES

By way of introduction, the following letter from
G E N E R A L C H A R L E S G. D A W E S is quoted:
" I want to express m y regret at not being able to be
present at the meeting of the Chicago Council on F o r e i g n
Relations at which Commander George P. A u l d is to speak.
" B e f o r e I became associated with M r . A u l d in reparations work I had read his brilliant articles on reparations
questions in the magazine " F o r e i g n Affairs," signed " A l p h a . "
H i s chief article showed that he was not only an economist,
but what is equally as important, a practical man.
Before
reading Commander Auld's article, I had read a number of
other economic contributions to the subject, and to me it was
like the sound of a clear bell in the fog.
" C o m m a n d e r A u l d ' s official connection with the reparations work and with the institution of the E x p e r t s ' P l a n in
Germany makes h i m an authority on the subject.
" W i t h best wishes to the Council on Foreign Relations
which, since its formation, has so signally demonstrated its
great and growing influence for better international understanding."
"Yours,
(Signed) Charles G . Dawes."
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S T A R T I N G T H E DAWES

PLAN

Address by
G E O R G E P. A U L D
I consider it a great privilege to meet the members of
the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and to take part
in their discussions. I speak before this company with diffidence. In the past year knowledge of what is going on in
Europe has become much more widely disseminated. Much
more than formerly our citizens have been going abroad with
a serious purpose; persons in a position to make close contact with European affairs and qualified to interpret them
intelligently and report on them faithfully. There are many
such present today. Mr. Hurley is here, a man who is charged
with a heavy responsibility in connection with the great question of inter-allied debts and who has demonstrated that he
is equal to that responsibility. Another sane and shrewd
observer of European affairs sits near me—a man who during
a considerable part of the past few months has served with
distinction at Berlin in a capacity which is best defined as the
Allied Chargéd'Affaires for Reparations. I refer, of course,
to my friend, Mr. Rufus Dawes. In these circumstances I
can justify my venturing to speak on the Dawes Plan and the
debt problem generally only by the thought that no two persons ever get precisely the same picture and that it is sometimes useful to compare notes.
The problem of Europe's public debts is primarily a problem for Europe, for she will stand or fall according as its
solution restores or further disintegrates the social fabric of
the old world. But from another point of view, it is our problem, for destiny has thrown such a preponderance of power
and prestige into our hands that American policy will be
determining in its solution.
Evidently we have a large
responsibility.
W i t h the starting of the Dawes Plan we have had an
impressive object lesson as to our potentialities in this new
role of World leadership, and we are beginning to be clear
as to the nature of our responsibility.
During a period of five years, while we groped for light
on the subject, our responsibility in practice was a passive
one. That may have been unavoidable. Perhaps the fever
4

of nationalistic passions in Europe had to abate somewhat
before we could hope to develop a genuinely American policy
and intervene effectively. More certainly, we had to stand
firm and perhaps impassive until the idea of cancellation of
debts had run its course.
That doctrine was presented to the American people by
well meaning economic experts as the complete answer. Our
responsibility was to be nothing more nor less than money
charity on a cosmic scale. W e were assured that this would
solve the reparation problem and cure the world of all its
economic ills. It was to be the universal panacea. Moreover, economic laws were said to make it inevitable, and it,
therefore, seemed to many to offer the quick and easy way
out. But the great majority of the American people instinctively rejected this solution, and very rightly. It was a false
philosophy and the so-called economic laws advanced in support of it, so far as we may now judge, had no real validity.
We may be quite sure that the people of Europe do not
need any such vast and indiscriminate money charity. They
need, it is true, considerate treatment—fair treatment—in the
matter of their debts to us. They need, also, an intelligent
response to their requirements for loans, and they need reasonable terms for those loans. But this will be only practical
common sense. The charity which they need is the real
charity of compassion and understanding. They need what
the Dawes plan is now giving them—something of the vigorous optimism of America in their councils. They need, very
vitally, and will continue to need, our moral support.
Until lately, we have failed them badly in this respect.
We have adopted a certain attitude of moral condescension
toward them. W e have been prone to condemn them for
their failures to achieve a real peace. Distance explains our
inadequate conception of the catastrophe which overwhelmed
Europe in 1914, and a totally different background of life
excuses in a measure our failure to appreciate the difficulties
of reconstruction. But to condemn what we do not fully
comprehend is to accentuate an element of intolerance in our
national character which is alien to American ideals.
Those who know what the sight of the first American
troops meant to the Allies in 1917 will understand what in
only lesser degree the arrival last winter of General Dawes,
Mr. Young and M r . Robinson meant to the weary protagonists in the reparation tragedy. It meant hope. Here at
last was a message from the young Colossus of the West in
5

whose hands all the threads of destiny were gathered. The
European peoples wanted peace, but they could not get it.
They were prisoners of a terrible stalemate. They needed to
find some common ground, and they found it almost immediately in the confidence inspired by General Dawes, whose
vigorous and practical mind cut through a fog of bitter doctrinaire and legalistic controversy down to the essentials.
A sure sense of political and social realities, a deep attachment
to the spirit of fair play and a genius for getting things done
were perhaps the greatest of the high qualifications which he
brought to the task of stabilizing Europe.
And during the deliberations of the Committee and later
when General Dawes had returned to the United States, the
representatives of the Allies and of Germany gave their confidence in full measure to his colleague. While the Plan was
being prepared and during the critical days of the London Conference and the starting of the Plan, they found in Owen D .
Young that rare combination of qualities which makes it possible for a few men in a generation to serve a great cause
greatly. A penetrating intellect, faith in humanity, courage,
patience and a just mind—these are some of the things that
have bound many men of many nationalities to Owen Young
and have brought honor to his name in Europe.
A new spirit of co-operation is abroad in Europe today.
It cannot be said that America created it, for such a thing
cannot be created out of hand. It was already there, but
America in the person of its representatives released it as
an active principle. The European machine is now running
and America furnished the oil which made it possible to set
it going. It was not started without great labor, great skill
and almost unbelieveable patience and good will on the part
of those who drafted the Report and those who participated
in the London Conference.
Europe's contribution was a great one. A t one of the
fateful moments of history, the premiers of England, France,
and Germany plainly showed that they were men of genuine
good will and great political courage. It may be said that
they were under the most vital necessity of reaching a settlement, for no one dared to consider the possible effects of a
rupture. But they acted courageously, none the less, and
they reaped their reward in finding widespread public support
for their policies.
The mechanical features of the actual starting of the plan
were significant only as they related to these moral aspects.
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The general background of the arrangement created by the
London Conference was acceptance of the principle of arbitration. Sixteen or seventeen separate arbitrations are provided for. Many of them are likely never to be invoked, for
an agreement to arbitrate is evidence of a frame of mind which
leads toward direct settlements by the parties themselves.
Up to the present every point of difference which has arisen
has shown itself susceptible of that sort of treatment.
The minimum of friction was caused by the application
of the plan. The control bodies set up in Berlin were accepted by the Germans with perfect good will. During the
interim period before the flotation of the loan, the German
Government met all its payments promptly and co-operated
in every way. The arrangements for deliveries of coal and
other products which had been in force in the occupied areas
were promptly extended by common consent on a commercial
basis, and a joint committee was formed to settle the details
of a continuing system of this character. Certain questions
of valuation of services rendered to the Armies of Occupation are still pending, but progress has been made toward
settlement. The economic sanctions were withdrawn by the
French and Belgians on the agreed schedule and unexpected
progress was made in the direction of military evacuation of
the Ruhr.
The crux of the application of the plan was the loan.
In principle, its flotation was a foregone conclusion. It was
bound to come. But i n practice, as the first of its kind, it
was evident that the question of the security behind it would
require careful examination. The negotiations were protracted and some feared that the delay might have unfortunate or even fatal results. Everything seemed to be poised
on a delicate balance which might at any moment be upset.
Happily the brief delay necessitated in the successive steps
for bringing the plan into operation had no serious results
whatever. The world seemed to have faith in the plan.
The Dawes plan has given Europe what it has so badly
needed for six unhappy years—a modus vivendi. It is only
that—like the organization of society itself—but that is its
virtue. It is a triumph of the principle of attending to first
things first, of acting on things agreed instead of waiting
for agreement on everything. One thing could not be agreed
—how much Germany was to pay in all—and it was the
quarrel over this question that had prostrated Europe. It
was a bitter speculative dispute and it was incapable of amicable settlement at the time for the reason that both creditor
7

gated in order that the theory might be properly tested. It
is therefore provided by the plan that the annuity shall be
paid in marks to the Agent General of the Allies at Berlin,
and the German liability discharged as these payments are
made. If the German people pay their taxes, no claim can
be advanced that Germany has defaulted. The problem of
transferring the payments abroad is up to the Allies, as
represented by the Transfer Committee.
This is the well known problem of the export surplus—
premised on the assertions of economists that debtor countries can pay their external obligations only by gold or goods.
As the supply of gold is limited, it would follow that they
can pay only by a huge surplus of exported goods, the creation
of which is probably impossible, or, if not impossible, raises
visions of a dumping menace to creditor nations. This
apparent dilemma runs through most discussions of the reparation and inter-allied debt question, and the doctrine from
which it is derived is widely accepted in England and America. It is a huge fallacy. A n y economist, if cross questioned,
will admit that debtor countries after exporting their available surplus of gold and goods have always settled their i n ternational balances by exporting their own securities. But
this fact of first importance the economist rules out on the
grounds that it does not constitute a final solution—that
some day the indebtedness will have to be finally paid off.
He returns, therefore, to the formula, gold or goods.
This insistence upon final solutions is the great weakness
of the doctrinaire. He dislikes the thought of permitting
nature to assume any of the responsibility for the solution of
the world's economic difficulties. But he has only developed
this weakness since the War. Before the War, when Europe
was the great creditor, the debtor countries of the world had a
private funded indebtedness to England, France and Germany
of 30,000,000,000 of pre-war dollars, equal to $45,000,000,000
of today, and this indebtedness at the time the W a r broke
out was being increased probably at the rate of $2,000,000,000
or $3,000,000,000 a year. The interest and the amortization payments on the individual debts making up this huge total were
regularly made without the least difficulty. No one bothered
to ask how it was done. There was no talk of a dumping
menace or unhealthy stimulation of the industries of the
debtor countries. The interest and amortization payments
were not taken in goods, but were reinvested. No exchange
difficulties arose for the reason that as individual issues were
paid off new issues simultaneously replaced them as an outlet
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for the surplus funds accruing to the account of the creditor
countries. In short, the indebtedness as a whole, so far as
anyone could foresee, was a permanent one.
The post-war question of whether a debtor country,
which by definition is a country with an export deficit, will
be able to produce an export surplus for the payment of its
debts, and thus become a creditor country, was never raised
before the war. It was one of the great open questions which
the future had to settle, if it needed to be settled at all. So
far as the American indebtedness was concerned fortuitous
circumstances settled it. By a colossal burst of productive
energy the United States poured billions of dollars worth of
goods into the insatiable furnace of war, and created a balance on the other side of the account. But this abnormal
operation will not soon or ever be repeated in a reverse direction. W e have returned to the normal situation, only with a
different set of debtors and creditors. When economists
assert that Germany or France cannot produce export surpluses sufficient to pay their debts, they may be correct.
When they say that this is the only way the debts could
ever be paid, they are certainly wrong.
Foreign capital in the form of loans has now begun to
flow into Germany. So long as this continues, it seems clear
that there will be no transfer problem, for the annuities will
be paid over the exchanges against these foreign currencies.
In this way the transfers for the year 1925 have already been
provided for and they are being regularly effected.
This seems likely to prove the definite solution of the
problem of transfer. For an indefinite period of years, Germany like certain other European countries, will be a debtor
nation and will presumably be in the position of having a private external debt of a permanent character, gradually taking
the place of the public external debt, as the latter is paid off.
It would appear that the payment of the reparation debt
and of the inter-allied debts hinges largely on the question of
whether the United States can and will finance Europe. It
seems evident that we will be able to do so for a considerable
period of years—perhaps indefinitely, certainly long enough so
that we need not worry about the question now. Nearly a
billion dollars of foreign securities have been sold in the
United States this year, without the least difficulty. E v i dently the investor believes Europe to be a good risk. When
Europe was the world creditor, she produced sufficient for
her own consumption plus her home capital requirements,
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At the close of Mr. Auld's address, the Chairman called on
Mr. Rufus C. Dawes for a few remarks.

R U F U S C. D A W E S .
One ought to hesitate to express too quickly an opinion
about such a paper as that to which we have just listened.
But I am ready to say that I think Commander Auld, with
his keen intelligence and broad sympathy, has shed new light
upon one of the most difficult problems of today, just as in
his articles in "Foreign Affairs" he showed a new avenue of
approach to the question which was then the very center of
the world's interests.
Robert Ingersoll said that if he were to create a world,
he would make health and not disease contagious, but Commander Auld has shown us that the mere human instinct to
gain a higher rate of interest may, in this crisis, be the salvation of the world.
The payment of war indemnities and international indebtedness is a burden resting upon the world, from which there
is no escape. The contemplation of these burdens arouses
fears as to the effect upon the progress of business, the comfort of the people, and the maintenance of peace. But the
debts are the inevitable result of the war. Many have wished
to see them cancelled, but that is impossible. They cannot
be brushed aside.
The plan of the Experts has now been written, in its
entirety, into an international treaty. It may not have been
a perfect plan, or even the best plan. But it was an agreement. That is the important thing. It was not an ideal
economic adjustment written upon a clean slate. It was a plan
for the re-establishment of relations between nations which
had been exhausted by war. It was an agreement and as such
was the beginning of the process of reconstruction.
It is consoling to be assured that nature itself offers
remedies for the repair of wounds that have been received,
and that automatic forces are likely to come into operation
in such a manner as to lighten the burdens which all must
share. By the sale of European securities in the United States,
which the desire for profit on the part of our investors will
bring about, the peoples of Europe will obtain the means of
stabilizing their currencies and replenishing their working
capital.
Through this process the period will be prolonged within
which the payment of the debt is to be made. Future gener14

ations will share, as they ought to share, in the adjustment of
these relations. If the time comes when it is realized that
these debts can never be paid, the men of some future generation can bury this corpse, but while these resources of our
national credit are alive and breathing, we cannot bury them.
And now since Commander Auld has made a reference to
my visit to Berlin, and has himself stated that Germany has
accepted and is carrying out in good faith the terms of the
London agreement, I feel I ought to add my testimony to
his, and to say, as M r . Owen D . Young, himself, has said,
that Germany has met in the fullest measure every promise
that it made. I may quote the words of that high-minded
statesman, Chancellor Marx, who said that his government
desired nothing more than to convince the world of its perfect
good faith. The time has come when we must accept such
assurances, and since even we, who meet in small gatherings
such as this, have some influence, we ought to assert it in such
a manner as to help rebuild faith and confidence in human
nature. We must lay aside our provincial prejudices and cease
to believe that because a man is a Frenchman, a German or
an Englishman, he is therefore a liar. When the Committee
of Experts met in Berlin during their early conferences, Chancellor Marx stated that this problem ought to be approached
by all in a spirit of Christian forbearance. In just this spirit
also the settlement must be applied.
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